makeshift materials often formed extensions o f town rubbish tips.11 The contrast between these living conditions and the growing prosperity of the country towns was marked, and it was an obvious source o f embarrassment to the Government. In the metropolitan area where some 159 people o f Aboriginal descent were said to be, most lived in Fitzroy 'in overcrowded, slum conditions, and frequently in "condemned" houses'.12 Their overcrowding was more acute than amongst other people living there. 13 McLean found on the part of the Protection Board that there had been 'a considerable diminution of apparent interest, and some avoidance of its responsibilities, over recent years'.14 Board members were honorary, and the Secretary to the Board, an officer of the Chief Secretary's Department, was able to devote only a small portion of his time to Board duties.15 According to McLean, the Board's recent policy was one of 'laisser-faire';16 this was a generous description.
McLean found that the Lake Tyers Station was hampering progress towards assimilation. Able-bodied 'half-castes' and their families were living there, receiving rations and being deprived o f 'any desire they might develop to seek permanent employment and fend for themselves'.17 He recommended that 'a firm policy of assimilation' should be implemented so that the number being cared for could be reduced to those who were 'aged, sick, infirm or otherwise necessitous'.18 He recommended the re-introduction o f a system of licences for the admission of any Aborigines of less than full descent to the Station. 11 McLean 1957:6-7 . Rowley wrote of these fringe-dwellers as 'beyond the statistics of poverty, beside the country towns of the south, often without even a recognized claim to their poor shacks, and dependent on the mercy and whims of the local officialdom'. (Rowley 1973:188) . For a graphic description of living conditions in a camp by a rubbish tip (though in Cunnamulla, Queensland), see Robertson and Carrick 1970:34 18 McLean 1957:14. Hausfeld has commented on the illogicality of a 'policy of assimilation'. One can only speculate about his reaction to 'a firm policy of assimilation '. Hausfeld 1963:32 . And Stanner has commented upon the difficulties inherent in any assimilation policy: 'We are asking them [Aborigines] to become a new people but this means, in human terms that we are asking them to un-be what they now are '. Stanner 1969:56. When McLean considered the conditions of the majority of people of Aboriginal descent who were living in 'sordid environments'19 in country camps, or in overcrowded conditions in the city, he recommended 'an active policy of assimilation '.20 This policy should be extended to all those with 'an admixture of aboriginal blood'21 who were in need of assistance. No longer should the Board's responsibilities be limited to Aborigines of full descent, and to those 'half-castes' specially licensed to live at Lake Tyers. McLean's advocacy of a policy of assimilation was in line with contemporary official thinking. At the 1951 Native Welfare Conference (a meeting attended by the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia ministers with responsibility for Aboriginal affairs), assimilation had been agreed upon as the aim of policies towards all aborigines.22
This 'active policy of assimilation' placed emphasis on re-housing projects and the development of improved educational and employment opportunities. It was a marked shift from earlier 'protection' policies which had in general excluded Aborigines of mixed descent from their ambit.
McLean's recommendations concerning Victoria's Aborigines had an objective, 'the goal of ultimate assimilation',23 to which all else was subordinate. In the mind of McLean, and in the understanding of the Victorian government which accepted his recommendations, it seems that 'ultimate assimilation' meant that people of Aboriginal descent would become so like those in the broader community that they would eventually become indistinguishable. If Aborigines were not going to die out,24 they would at least fade from notice.
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The Victorian government acted promptly on McLean's recommendations, passing the Aborigines A ct 1957 which replaced the Board for the Protection of the Aborigines with the Aborigines Welfare Board.25 The new Board's function was 'to promote the moral, intellectual and physical welfare of aborigines. .. with a view to their assimilation into the general community'26 and its responsibilities extended to all people of Aboriginal descent.
The Board was established in an atmosphere of political crisis and it was expected to act immediately.27 These were not circumstances conducive to the formulation of coherent policy goals and procedures. The Board lacked a comprehensive picture of the Victorian Aboriginal population, being guided, at least in its early years, by McLean's limited perceptions. McLean had seriously underestimated the size of the population of Aboriginal descent and had viewed this population as consisting of individuals similar to poor whites.28 He had not perceived the inter-relatedness of different Aboriginal groups, nor had he articulated any notion of an Aboriginal community.
In its latter years, two factions emerged within the Board. One tended to see Aborigines as failed whites, as irresponsible people who were generally undeserving of the Board's efforts on their behalf. The other saw Aborigines as victims of widespread discrimination and prejudice in a culture-clash with white Australians. The latter group favoured compensatory aid for the members of what it regarded as a distinct community 29 It was largely the agitation of the second faction, both within the Welfare Board and outside it, that led to the Board being replaced in 1968 by a new administration, the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs.30
The its staff37 came close to being unworkable. In these circumstances, policy formulation tended to be haphazard, and decisions made at the monthly meetings were not infrequently reversed at subsequent meetings.38 Annual Reports to Parliament in the period 1958-1967 record the Board's activities and the progress (or otherwise) of Aboriginal policy in Victoria. Rowley's comment is pertinent concerning the capacity of official reports 'to conceal rather than reveal. Ever since the days of British colonial administration a form of words and a phoney optimism had been used to keep the record respectable and the government happy'.39
A tension is evident in the Reports. On the one hand the Board's pleas for greater funding and more staff were based on claims of success in such matters as the satisfactory housing of families previously resident in riverbank camps. On the other, the Board felt obliged to record what it saw as failings: limited success in encouraging Aboriginal students to stay at school; limited success in promoting the employment of Aboriginal adults in steady, year-round work; problems of rental arrears and so on.
Successive reports comment upon lack of staff, especially welfare officers. Full time staff at the time of the first Report in 1958 consisted of the Superintendent,40 the Secretary to the Board,41 one Welfare Officer and a part-time housing officer at Mooroopna. In addition there was the resident staff at Lake Tyers: a Manager, Sub-Manager, Matron and Assistant Matron. Even when finance was available, there were difficulties in attracting suitable applicants. Although the staff consisted of twenty-three full-time and five part-time members in 1967, turnover was a continuing problem. All positions went to non-Ab original people. Whether suitable Aboriginal appointees were available remains uncertain; it seems, however, that the Board made no special efforts to recmit Aboriginal staff.
A re-housing program was at the heart of the Welfare Board's assimilation plan. 'Assimilation', in the view of Board members, meant that Aborigines should remain 'physiologically visible' but otherwise become identical with ordinary white Australians.42 It was the Board's belief that if Aborigines could be transferred from sub-standard housing to satisfactory housing that was close to employment opportunities, then they would take up jobs, encourage their children to attend local schools, pay rent and so on. That the Board adopted this broad plan is entirely understandable. McLean had highlighted the appalling housing conditions that were the lot of Aborigines throughout Victoria. He had accepted the view that because indigenous languages and rituals had disappeared, Aborigines ought to be treated as if they were poor whites. For McLean, and for the Board which set out to implement his recommendations, the distinct histories of Victoria's Aboriginal groups were not known, nor were the relationships both within and between the groups understood. Whether such knowledge would have altered the Board's policies is, in any case, doubtful. The Welfare Board tackled the improvement of the Aborigines' physical environment with enthusiasm. In April 1958, just eight months after its first meeting, its first housing project, the Rumbalara Housing Settlement, was opened on land outside Mooroopna. Ten specially built prefabricated concrete houses were made available to families previously occupying some of the thirty-four riverside shacks at Mooroopna. The staging houses were let at subsidised rents, and electricity was paid for through a slot-meter installed at each house. Initially, they seemed a success. A part-time officer of the Board collected rents and supervised the settlement; visitors were discouraged. One family was soon re-located in Mooroopna itself, and the Board decided to undertake a similar project at Robinvale. This second project, the Manatunga Housing Settlement, containing twelve pre-cast concrete houses, was opened in 1960.
In 1961, however, the Board decided that the Rumbalara and Manatunga Housing Settlements were 'too segregated' from white communities to fit in with the policy of assimilation. The notion of providing further staging houses was abandoned and the Board concentrated its efforts on providing housing in country towns, not in separate settlements outside them. 43 Each successive survey conducted by the Board emphasised that its provision of housing was falling far short of perceived needs. There were three reasons for this. First, the Board started its work believing the Aboriginal population to be considerably smaller than it proved to be. Second, it did not anticipate the growth in the Aboriginal population that occurred. Third, the resources -finance, staff and strategies -at the disposal of the Board were inadequate for the task it set itself.
In 1958, the Board considered that at least 150 houses were required to meet housing needs throughout the state. Only some thirty Aboriginal families had by then become Housing Commission tenants of their own accord. In 1959 in support of its plea to parliament for funding to provide at least some of the two hundred houses then considered necessary, the Board stated that in general, Aboriginal housing was the worst in the state. It also stated that because of the poor physical environments in which Aboriginal children were being raised, many were being placed in institutional care following intervention by police.
As winter approached in 1961, a Board survey revealed that 197 families were in need of housing; about fifty of these families were living in shacks or riverbank humpies. Despite the fact that the Board had provided twenty-nine houses in the past year, young couples establishing families meant there was an undiminished housing need. By 1964, seventy-three Aboriginal families were living in Board houses, and a further fifty-three in Housing Commission houses or flats but a further 205 families were still in need of housing. The Board's housing program was falling behind. In 1965, the Aborigines (Amendment) A ct transferred from the Chief Secretary to the Minister of Housing responsibility for the Board's work.44 The change acknowledged the importance of the Board's housing activities. The legislation also increased the Board's size from ten to eleven; the new member was to be appointed by the Governor in Council from a panel of three people put forward by the Aborigines Advancement League. This amendment, indicative of the League's growing influence, resulted in a political scientist -Dr Colin Tatz -joining the Board.45
In its 1965 survey of housing needs, the Board estimated that there were 'over 3,000 part-Aborigines in Victoria' and that 220 houses were required. Few families remained in riverbank shacks and humpies but 'doubling-up' in sub-standard accommodation was still common.
The Board's last Report to Parliament noted that only twelve or so riverbank humpies remained in the state. Some were recently built. By 1967, the Board had provided 116 houses in various country areas and at least 145 families were tenants of the Housing Commission. Stated in statistical terms, the assimilation policy as expressed through its housing program may seem to have been successful. But whatever success the Board had in achieving 'assimilation' was gained at a very high price. Tatz has characterised the Board's policy in the following way:
[I]n Victoria, policy -if it had any meaning at all -was a matter of getting Aborigines into white-type houses, anywhere, anyhow, so that an aerial inspection could demonstrate the essential integration, assimilation, alikeness, equality and colourlessness of galvanised iron roofs.46 Decisions about who was to be housed, when, how and where were made by the Board. Victoria's Aboriginal population was administered in much the same way that a stern principal runs a school; decisions were made on high and imposed on those below. The language of the Board's Reports is often indicative of how it viewed its role. Aboriginal families were to be 'trained', 'rehabilitated', 'supervised', 'promoted' to new housing when they had 'proven themselves', and so on. While improved housing was desperately needed, the Board's approach assumed that if housing were provided, those who were formerly living in riverbank camps would quickly adapt to it and to white patterns of behaviour, and be eternally grateful.
The style and design of houses provided by the Board was typically suburban. They were almost invariably of three bedrooms, despite the large families the Board frequently reported, and despite the frequent inter-house visiting by relatives and friends that the Board so abhorred. Housing design was a powerful instrument of the Board's assimilation policy, and was not negotiable with those to be housed.
In its 1965 Report, the Board admitted that its system of defining housing priorities was not being communicated to those to be housed. The Board's selection of families to be re-housed must have seemed arbitrary to those waiting. They had no formal way of making their views known to the Board. In 'pepper-potting', or scattering Aborigines from riverbank humpies into towns and suburbs wherever the Board was able to buy land and build houses,47 the Board was acting either deliberately or unwittingly so as to threaten Aboriginal kinship ties and community living. Both Tatz and Boas suggest the attempt to sever ties between individuals and groups was deliberate.48 No doubt Board members considered that if Aboriginal families could let go of the old ways, their chances of fitting in to white neighbourhoods would be enhanced.
Although the Board certainly knew about the appalling housing conditions, poor health, poor education standards and poor unemployment record of its charges when it began work, its members had little knowledge of the dynamics of this minority group, little appreciation of its values and of the ties of some of its members to particular localities. While the Board was able to see that traditional customs, languages and ceremonies had all but disappeared, it was not able to appreciate that new and coherent patterns of behaviour and belief had taken their place. What to the Board was senseless overcrowding was to Aborigines a matter of finding accommodation near seasonal work (without the fear of rebuff at white sources of accommodation) and a matter of maintaining ties with kin and friends.49 In general it seems that the Board thought it was dealing with passive individuals whose behaviour could be moulded into acceptable white patterns of living. The thinking seems to have been: 'If we can house these people in white houses, they will quickly come to act like white people'.
Not surprisingly, despite improved housing for many Aboriginal families, the Board's activities proved counter-productive. Rental arrears, poor housekeeping standards, property and overcrowding were all matters that regularly came to its attention. All can be seen as the logical responses of people who had been forcefully displaced.50 The force used was not physical; it was administrative, bureaucratic and paternal. Some families resisted it by refusing to be re-housed and staying put in sub standard housing.51
The Board's administration in the areas of education, employment, health-care and welfare work was informed by the same kind of approach used in the housing area. Even though the policy of assimilation that the Board was implementing was re-defined in December 1966,52 the thrust of its activities continued to be to try and shepherd Aboriginal people into white patterns of employment, education53 and housing. Within the Board, especially since the inclusion of Dr Tatz, one group was having doubts about its administrative structure, and about its methods of policy formulation and implementation. This group began to lobby for the Board's replacement by a Ministry and Department of Aboriginal Affairs. As public criticism was growing concerning the Board's administration (especially with regard to the Lake Tyers Station), the state government in October 1967 introduced legislation to establish a Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs. That a complete reassessment of Victorian Aboriginal affairs policy was urgently needed was indicated by the fact that the state opposition strongly supported the new legislation.54
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Although Victoria's Aboriginal Affairs A ct 1967 came into operation on 1 January 1968, repealing the Aborigines A ct 1958 and establishing the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, it was May 1968 before new initiatives began to emerge. It was then that the Ministry's Director, Mr M.R. Worthy, a social worker, took up his position. Because the new Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, E.R. Meagher, had additional portfolios (Housing and Forests), the new permanent head had a large degree of autonomy in formulating specific policies.55 The broad policy objective embodied in the new legislation was the promotion of 'the social and economic advancement of aborigines in Victoria'.56
The Minister's responsibilities, to be carried out by the Director, were extensive. They included taking appropriate measures to provide housing and housing loans; educational assistance; health and medical care; employment and training; rehabilitation and welfare programs and legal aid. The Minister was also required to coordinate the activities of voluntary organisations concerned with the welfare of Aborigines and to disseminate information to the public concerning Aborigines. His extensive powers indicated the government's determination to effect sweeping changes. The somewhat haphazard administration of the Aborigines Welfare Board was to be replaced by an efficient, powerful government machine.
Whereas the Welfare Board had always experienced funding difficulties, no such problem faced the Ministry. Funding came largely from the Commonwealth Office of Aboriginal Affairs within the Prime Minister's Department.57 The Office was established to advise the Commonwealth government concerning the formulation of national policies towards Aborigines. While the main responsibility for formulating and implementing policies concerning Aborigines remained with the states, the Commonwealth now contributed financially to the various states' programs. The Aboriginal Affairs A ct 1967 also created an Aboriginal Affairs Advisory Council to advise the Minister, With the changes brought about by the Aboriginal Affairs (Amendment) A ct 1968, membership of the Council was to consist of the Director as chairman, six people appointed by the Minister because of their expertise in areas such as health care, education, housing and social welfare, and six Aborigines who were to be elected on a regional basis. Although the Council met on a monthly basis, it came to be seen by Aborigines at least, as a 'powerless and paternal organ'.58 In reality, power over the shape and implementation of Aboriginal affairs policy in Victoria was firmly in the hands of the Director.
In 1969 the Ministry's staff increased from thirty-four to seventy-four, including twenty-three Aborigines, thirteen of whom were employed as farm hands at the Lake Tyers Station. In 1970, when it was estimated that there were about five thousand Aborigines in Victoria, the Ministry's staff had increased to eighty-six. For the next four years, the number of staff remained at about this level. Generally about 30 per cent of the Ministry's staff were Aboriginal, most being employed pursuant to the Aboriginal Affairs (Amendment) A ct 1968 which allowed it to employ Aboriginal staff without having to comply with the provisions of the Public Service A ct 1968. At any one time, about ten of the Ministry's employees were social workers. In addition, there were visiting nurses, housekeeping advisers, liaison and field officers, rent collectors, research and publications officers and administrative staff. Not all the staff were based in Melbourne;some lived at Lake Tyers or at regional offices at Shepparton, Swan Hill, Robinvale, Ballarat, Bairnsdale and Morwell. This commitment of resources to the area of Aboriginal affairs was unparalleled; finance provided by the Victorian government each year was significantly augmented by Federal funds.
Compared with the Welfare Board, the Ministry had more accurate information concerning the size and geographic location of Victoria's Aboriginal population, and as a valuable legacy from the Welfare Board days, it had the Board's 1966 policy document. That document, in seeking to define the overriding policy of assimilation, emphasised that Aborigines had a right to retain their unique cultural identity if they so desired. The document also emphasised that Aboriginal views on matters affecting them should be given 'full consideration'.59 Despite the creation late in the Board's life of a progressive and coherent policy document, the Ministry saw as its guiding light a concept of equality which was to be achieved by 'interventive technologies'.60 Aborigines in Victoria were to become equal to other Victorians through a series of interventive programs which would eliminate Aboriginal deficiencies in education, employment, health and housing and as well, modify the views of the white community concerning Aborigines. The broad strategy of the Ministry has been described as a 'race relations' program.61 Whereas the Welfare Board's primary aim was quite specific -to improve the poor housing conditions of Aborigines, conditions that were highly visible and politically embarrassing to the government of the day - the Ministry directed programs towards both the Aboriginal and white populations of Victoria. The programs, across a broad range of areas, were designed to produce 'boundary permeability'.62 Obstacles preventing Aborigines from participating fully in the life of the general community were to be removed. These obstacles were seen to include inadequate job and social skills, poor health standards, and the unfavourable images of Aborigines held by large sections of the white population.
While the Welfare Board wanted to avoid conflict and tension in implementing its housing program, the Ministry believed that conflict could be engineered and then managed to achieve desired ends.63 The Ministry was supremely confident of the efficacy of its social work theories and strategies,64 believing that Aborigines would ultimately benefit from the programs, even if in the short term the programs produced uncertainty or a sense of crisis in their recipients. In his first report, the newly appointed Director thanked Victoria's Aborigines for 'their willingness to attempt to understand the confusing changes which have again been thrust on them'. While Mr Worthy promised that in future 'consultation will be the key and the basis for all advancement in Aboriginal Affairs' 65 this in practice amounted to little more than attempts to ascertain the likelihood of acceptance for, or opposition to, already formulated plans. Despite the fact that the Ministry had a number of methods of consulting Aboriginal opinion,66 it is difficult to believe that that opinion counted for much alongside the faith shown by officials in the scientific basis of their programs.
The Ministry's first concern was to abolish any practice that smacked of a paternalistic, 'hand-out' mentality. In its view, if it acted as a buffer between Aborigines and the usual sanctions applied by authorities within the community for acts such as damage to property or omissions such as non-payment of rent, Aborigines would receive confirmation of their inferior status. This strand in the Ministry's thinking was at odds with its determination to make up the deficit for Aboriginal people in terms of health standards, education levels, job skills and so on. On the one hand, the Ministry saw no justification for behaviour which treated Aborigines 'differently'. On the other, the whole raison d 'etre of the Ministry was to promote 'the social and economic advancement' of the state's Aborigines by providing special schemes for Aborigines. It seems the Ministry never clearly resolved this dilemma. In the name of promoting 'equality', it scrapped some Welfare Board schemes and launched a wide variety of programs of its own in the fields of education, housing, employment and training, and public relations.
These activities took place during a time of rapid social change in Australia. American and Australian involvement in the Vietnam war was provoking a widespread reassessment of national goals and values. Government policies towards Aborigines made up just one aspect of life in Australia that was widely being subjected to scrutiny. Not only were people taking an increased interest in Aboriginal affairs, they were actively involved in trying to help. In 1969, there were thirty-five voluntary organisations in Victoria working in the field of Aboriginal affairs, seventeen of them in Melbourne.67 It was the Ministry's task to coordinate the activities of these various groups, as well as the occasional work done by service clubs, church groups and schools. The task was a formidable one.
The Ministry saw improved educational standards as central to creating greater opportunities for Aborigines and as the key to promoting increased acceptance of them. To encourage secondary students to stay at school and to assist their families financially, it extended a scheme commenced by the Board under which students were paid an annual clothing and book allowance. In 1969, the system of giving clothing vouchers to those eligible was replaced by a system of direct cash payments. The indignities of the Board's paternalistic approach were being removed. While enrolments in secondary schools continually increased during the Ministry's existence,68 there was a continuing concern that Aboriginal students were seriously under-represented in the upper forms and in tertiary education institutions. The Ministry supported an adult education scheme at Swan Hill and it initiated a tutorial scheme which involved undergraduate students at tertiary institutions visiting Aboriginal students in their homes to offer assistance and advice concerning study.
Financial assistance was provided for the needy parents of primary students, and under one scheme, payments (known as 'scholarships'), were granted to children and parents on the basis of satisfactory attendance and achievement at primary schools by the children. A pre-school scheme was introduced in 1972 and a year later, a mobile pre-school (staffed by two kindergarten teachers and two Aboriginal assistants) began operating in East Gippsland.
The Ministry continued to acquire and rent houses, announcing that it would be 'several years before every Aboriginal family is able to obtain adequate conventional housing'.69 In 1969 it introduced grants of $1,500 to assist with the purchase of properties. After screening applicants, social workers recommended the payment of some twenty to thirty grants each year. Meanwhile the Rumbalara and Manatunga 'transition settlements' were dismantled.
Numerous programs were developed as part of a wider plan o f 'social engineering': training and employment schemes and public relations activities. The Ministry's faith in the scientific basis of its programs was unwavering: The Ministry believes that social engineering principles are as fundamental as any relating to the physical sciences. The programs which have been developed and maintained in this State, based on these principles, are a clear demonstration of the validity of this claim.70 But the 1974 annual report revealed that the programs, and those who implemented them, were not always appreciated:
The foundations for the development of initiatives to remove the need for welfare have been laid using the social engineering skills of a dedicated staff who, on many occasions, have been misunderstood by the people whom they have served.71
The ultimate goal was 'a truly united community with all citizens sharing equal responsibility and opportunity'.72 This vision meant Ministry efforts were aimed at encouraging Aboriginal people to use the health, welfare and legal aid facilities already supplied by other government departments or employment, housing or welfare agencies. These services were not to be re-shaped to meet Aboriginal needs; the people were to be prepared to cope with the services. If the Ministry were successful, it thought it could work itself out of a job in twenty years. In the early 1970s, separate Aboriginal health and legal aid services were being discussed, much to the chagrin of the Ministry. The idea that Aborigines should 'run their own affairs' was anathema to those who hoped that the affairs of Aborigines would soon merge with those of the rest of the population.73
Yet Aboriginal people did want to run what they saw as their own affairs. The Ministry was unprepared for opposition to its policies and administration, and opposition there most certainly was. The principles of social engineering were being implemented at a time when Aboriginal groups and individuals were becoming politically active and when the numbers of their white supporters were growing. A keener sense of identity meant Aborigines were moving away from the integration plan guiding the Ministry. The 1973 report noted that Aboriginal people in Melbourne were planning their own health service, which was quite contrary to Ministry policy. Matters were beginning to get beyond its control and the experience was not pleasant; opposition increased.
The popular fashion in Aboriginal affairs this year [1973] is to "knock" government departments irrespective of whether it is action or inaction which is under scrutiny. The result is always the same -we are damned if we do and damned if we don't . . . If we employ Aborigines they are accused for being "stooges" ; if we don't employ them we are accused of denying them employment opportunities . . . If we promote Aboriginal organisations we are told we have supported the "wrong ones" ; if we neglect to promote Aboriginal organisations we are told we are "empire building" for white administrators . . . It is interesting to note that on all occasions there are Aborigines and members of the public who take both sides of every issue.74 The widening gap between the Ministry and those it was meant to serve is evident in the following report of two meetings: In addition to the consultation between Ministry officers and Aboriginal people during normal activities, two formal meetings were held in the Goulburn Valley and East Gippsland areas. It was clearly evident from the tension which was created during the meetings that communication between Government authorities and the people must increase. Heated discussion, denials and counter-denials revealed a serious credibility gap.75 For an increasing number of Aboriginal people, the Ministry was becoming 'the enemy'. It was a bureaucratic government department staffed principally by white people. The Ministry, rather than Aboriginal people, decided how 'Aboriginal money' (money allocated for spending on Aboriginal affairs) was to be spent. Inevitably it became the first target for Aboriginal groups and individuals exercising new-found political power, principally because its policies gave Ministry officials considerable power over the lives of Aboriginal people. They decided which Aboriginal families would be allocated housing loans and Ministry rental accommodation;76 which tenants would be evicted; which subsidised rents would be increased to commercial levels; which potential employees would receive training; which non-Aboriginal voluntary organisations would receive Ministry assistance; which Aboriginal organisations would receive Ministry funding; and so on. The Ministry set the priorities. It initiated some schemes, and rejected others, all in the name of 'social engineering', a program designed to merge Aboriginal people with the broader population. It became a focus around which Aboriginal groups coalesced because of their opposition to the Ministry's administration. The Ministry was indeed fostering political activity, but not the type it favoured.
Opposition 
